Abstract. In this paper, we summarize the recent related-key differential and boomerang attacks on AES by Biryukov et al. and present a framework for protection against these attacks. Then we study an alternative AES key schedule proposed by May et al. at ACISP 2002 as a possible candidate to protect against these related key attacks. We find that there exist equivalent keys for this key schedule and in response, we propose an improvement to overcome this weakness. We proceed to prove, using our framework, that our improved May et al.'s key schedule is secure against related-key differential and boomerang attacks. Since May et al.'s key schedule is not on-the-fly (which is a requirement for some hardware implementations), we propose an on-the-fly AES key schedule that is resistant against related-key differential and boomerang attacks.
Introduction
In [4] , Biryukov et al. launched the first known key-recovery attack on AES-256. It is a related-key differential attack that exploits a differential characteristic path of high probability, where we allow both the plaintext and key to have nonzero differentials. The attack has a time/data complexity of 2 131 and requires 2
This allowed the authors to avoid the majority of the active S-boxes in the differential characteristic of [4] , which resulted in a much improved attack with time and data complexity of 2 99.5 , requiring 2 77 memory and just 4 related keys. A similar approach was used to derive a related-key boomerang attack on AES-192 with data complexity 2 123 , time complexity 2 176 , and memory complexity 2 152 in addition to 4 related keys. This is also the first known key-recovery attack on full AES-192. However, we need adaptive ciphertext decryption for the attack of [3] whereas only chosen plaintext encryption is needed for the attack of [4] . We shall summarize Biryukov et al.'s attacks from [3, 4] and present a framework for protection against related-key differential attack. Basically, we want the number of active S-boxes in a differential characteristic of the key schedule and the number of active S-boxes in the differential characteristic of the main cipher, conditioned on subkey differences from the key schedule, to be large enough. In that case, we say the cipher has practical resistance against related-key differential and boomerang attacks.
The structure of the AES-256 cipher is still very secure as the best non related-key attacks can work up to at most 8 of the 14 rounds [11] . The more devastating related key attacks [3, 4] exploits the high linearity in the AES-256 key schedule. If we look only at a key schedule differential characteristic path, it is possible to find paths which involve only one active S-box. Thus a key point in securing AES against the latest related-key differential/boomerang attacks is to make the key schedule more nonlinear, so that any related-key differential path would involve more active S-boxes in the subkey differences 4 .
Our Contribution
We design two new AES variants to protect against the related-key attacks of [3, 4] by making the AES key schedule more nonlinear, while keeping the main AES cipher the same. Thus we retain the strong security of AES against non related-key attacks. Construction 1: In Section 3, we consider the possibility of using an alternative AES key schedule by May et al. [13] . This key schedule was shown to have good statistical properties while achieving the strong property of round key irreversibility and resistance against previously known related-key attacks [1] . However, we show in Section 3.1 that there are pairs of equivalent keys that produce the same encryption functions. We propose an improvement of their key schedule in Section 3.2 that avoids this weakness. Based on our framework, we prove in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 that the improved May et al.'s key schedules for AES have practical resistance against related-key differential and boomerang attacks. This key schedule is also secure against related-cipher attacks and slide attacks, and has round key irreversibility.
Construction 2: However, our improved May et al.'s design uses three AES rounds to derive a subkey. This is too expensive for hardware implementation, which requires on-the-fly key schedule. In Section 4, we propose an on-the-fly key schedule design for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256, where the time needed to derive each round key is no more than the computation of 1.25 (amortized) AES rounds. Furthermore, we prove that this new key schedule has practical resistance against related-key differential and boomerang attacks. This key schedule is also secure against related-cipher attacks and slide attacks, and has partial round key irreversibility.
Comparison with obvious counter-measures: There are some intuitive ways to protect against the related-key attacks of [3, 4] . One way is to increase the number of rounds of AES (e.g. doubling the number of rounds, so that the number of active S-boxes in Biryukov et al.'s differential path would become too numerous for their attack to be feasible). The other way is to hash the secret key before passing it through the AES key schedule (so that it is hard for an adversary to control the key differences into the AES key schedule). So why do we need to design a separate AES key schedule instead of using these obvious fixes? The advantages of our constructions are:
(1) We use a systematic approach to prove protection against the related-key attacks of [3, 4] by bounding the related-key differential probability for any characteristic path, while the obvious counter measures are more intuitive. (2) In the two obvious counter-measures mentioned above (increasing the number of rounds and hashing the key), the AES key schedule is used. This allows the adversary to deduce all the other round keys from 1 round key (respectively 2 round keys) by working through the key schedule backwards for AES-128 (respectively AES-256). Our improved May et. al.'s key schedule of Section 3 provides round key irreversibility, which forces an adversary to attack every round key. Our on-the-fly key schedule of Section 4 provides partial round key irreversibility. (3) The obvious counter-measure of increasing the number of rounds (e.g. doubling the number of rounds) will slow down encryption speed while the other counter-measure of hashing the secret key does not allow it to be on-the-fly in hardware (because of the extra hashing per key set-up). In comparison, our AES key schedule of Section 4 is on-the-fly and has comparable encryption speed as AES.
Framework for Protection Against Related Key Differential and Boomerang Attacks

Some Definitions and Notation
We first define some notation and concepts which form the basis of differential attacks. Given a block cipher, the plaintext, secret key and ciphertext are denoted by P , K and C respectively. The encryption and decryption processes are denoted by C = E K (P ) and P = E −1 K (C) respectively. We denote the input of the first round by P 0 , and the output of the i th round by P i , i = 1, . . . , N R, where N R is the number of rounds. We see that the input of round i is P i−1 , and that P 0 = P and P N R = C. Similarly, we write K i , i = 0, . . . , m, for the m + 1 subkeys generated by the key schedule.
To launch a differential attack, one attempts to find a pair of differences in the plaintext and ciphertext that occur with high probability. This usually involves finding a sequence of round inputs and outputs that occur with high probability. We write ∆P and ∆C to denote a plaintext and ciphertext difference respectively, and ∆P i to denote the difference in the round output of round i. A differential characteristic refers to a sequence of input differences to the rounds
We abbreviate the above expression to (∆P dc −→ ∆C). Similarly, to launch a related-key differential attack, one attempts to find a set of differences for (P, K, C) that hold with high probability. We shall see that this can be done by finding a sequence of differences in the key and subkeys generated by the key schedule, and the plaintext and round outputs generated by the main cipher, such that these differences occur with high probability.
We first consider a differential characteristic in the key schedule alone. We denote a difference in the key by ∆K, and differences in the subkeys ∆K i , i = 0, . . . , m. We note that the subkeys are not necessarily derived sequentially from each other, so the concept of a differential characteristic 'path' may not exist in this sense. We therefore write (∆K dc −→ ∆K 0 , . . . , ∆K m ) for a differential characteristic in the key schedule. Now we consider a differential characteristic in the key schedule and the main cipher. We write this as
which we abbreviate to (∆P, ∆K dc −→ ∆C). We also define:
It is easy to see that P rob(∆P, ∆K dc −→ ∆C) = p k × p c|k by Bayes' Theorem.
Related-Key Differential Attack of [4]
In [4] , Biryukov et al. highlighted two main observations of AES-256: slow diffusion in the key schedule reversal and the presence of local collisions due to the matching differential properties between the key schedule and the main cipher. By exploiting these weaknesses, they found a related-key key-recovery attack on full-round AES-256 with total complexity of 2 131 time and 2 65 memory, and an average of 2 35 related keys. In this section, we give a gist of the attack. The interested reader should refer to [4] for the details.
All 128-bit state blocks of AES are written as a 4 × 4 array of bytes. The byte in the i-th row and j-th column is denoted by M [i, j]. We write the main cipher as follows:
The authors placed the 2-round characteristic called a local collision in rounds 12 and 13, i.e. r = 12 and thus, ∆B 12 = ∆A 14 = 0. Working backwards from there, the aim then is to construct a differential characteristic of high probability. Biryukov et al. managed to find such a characteristic with specified differences such that there are 5 active S-boxes in the key schedule and 15 active S-boxes in the main cipher from ∆A 2 onwards. Therefore, the attack works for 1 out of 2 35 key pairs and the differential characteristic probability in the main cipher is 2 −93 . After a differential characteristic of high probability, (∆P, ∆K 31 wrong pairs. This is because for a fixed key, each structure will contain 2 64 pairs with the right differences after the S-boxes of the 2 nd round. The remaining active S-boxes in rounds 3-14 satisfy the characteristic with probability 2 −93 . Therefore, each structure produces a pair of ciphertexts with the right differences with probability 2 64−93 = 2 −29 . Consequently, 2 31 structures produces on average 2 31−29 = 4 right pairs and 2 31+128−128 = 2 31 wrong pairs. All 4 right pairs will vote for the correct 80-bit key while the 2 31 wrong pairs will suggest 2 47 random keys. Each wrong key is thus expected to occur 2 −33 times only, which is much less than 4. On the other hand, with a wrong related-key pair that fails to satisfy the required key schedule characteristic, there will also be about 2 31 wrong plaintext-ciphertext pairs, which will give rise to approximately 2 47 random key suggestions and hence, each wrong key also only appears at most once on average. Therefore, no wrong key guesses will survive the last step, and the correct 80 key bits will be found as a result.
Protection Against Related-Key Differential Attack: The attacker must run through p −1 k key pairs on average in order to find one that satisfies the specified differential characteristic in the key schedule. For each key pair, the differential attack has complexity O(p −1 c|k ) and needs the same number of chosen plaintexts, so in total the complexity is O((p c|k p k ) −1 ). In the attack of [4] , we have p k = 2 −35 , p c|k = 2 −93 , and with some computational overheads get an attack complexity of 2 131 . We can defend against this attack by having p k × p c|k < 2 −N K where N K is the key size of the cipher, for any related-key differential characteristic, i.e. no good distinguisher can be found that can be exploited in a related-key differential attack. The attack also cannot be applied if p c|k < 2 −N B , where N B is the block size of the cipher, as there would be insufficient plaintexts to launch the attack.
Related-Key Boomerang Attack of [3]
The main idea behind the boomerang attack [2, 17] is to use two short differential characteristics of high probabilities instead of one long differential characteristic of low probability. We assume that a block cipher E :
N B can be described as a composition of two sub-ciphers, i.e. E = E 1 • E 0 . Here, N B and N K denote the block size and key size of the cipher respectively. Suppose we have a related-key differential characteristic α → β of E 0 (excluding a couple of rounds at the beginning of the cipher) under a key difference ∆K 0 with probability p and another related-key differential characteristic γ → δ for E 1 under key difference ∆K 1 with probability q. Here, p = p k × p c|k where p k is the probability that the differential characteristic path in the key schedule corresponding to E 0 will be satisfied while p c|k is the probability that the differential characteristic path in the main cipher, α → β in E 0 , will be satisfied given that the key differential characteristic is satisfied. Likewise, q = q k × q c|k with similar definitions pertaining to E 1 . The differential characteristic trails of E 0 and E 1 are called upper and lower trails respectively.
The related-key boomerang process involves four different unknown but related keys. The relation between the keys can be an arbitrary bijective function R chosen in advance by the attacker. A plaintext pair results in a quartet with probability p 2 q 2 whereas for a random permutation, the probability of obtaining a good quartet is 2 −N B .
More concretely, for AES-256, the related-key boomerang attack [3] exploits local collisions (as explained in Section 2.2) and ladder switching to gain a middle round for free. The upper trail for AES-256 covers rounds 1-8 and the lower trail covers rounds 8-14. There are four related keys:
The switching state is the state A 9 and a special key state K S , which is the concatenation of K 7 and K 8 . The plaintext difference is specified in 9 bytes and the probability of the boomerang quartet after the first round is 2 −96 . The attack works as follows. Do the following steps 2 25.5 times:
(1) Prepare a structure of 2 72 plaintexts where the following 56 bits are constant: We can obtain 2 144 ordered pairs for each structure. Of these pairs, 2 72 will pass the first round. Therefore, we can expect one right quartet per 2 96−72 = 2 24 structures and three right quartets out of 2 25.5 structures. On the other hand, there will be approximately 2 91.5 noisy quartets in total. These candidate quartets will then be used to vote for the right key values. The probability that three wrong quartets propose the same candidate key values does not exceed 2 −80 . The attack has 2 99.5 data and time complexity and requires 2 77.5 memory for the filtering step.
Protection Against Related-Key Boomerang Attack: The attacker must run through (p k q k ) −2 quartets of related keys on average in order to find one that satisfies the specified differential characteristic in the key schedule. For each quartet, the attack has complexity O((p c|k q c|k ) −2 ), so in total the complexity is
, and with some computational overheads get an attack complexity of 2 99.5 . We can defend against this attack by having (
where N K is the key size of the cipher, for all decompositions of the cipher into two smaller sub-ciphers and for all differential characteristics for these subciphers. This would mean that there do not exist any boomerang quartets of high probability that can be exploited. The attack also cannot be applied if 15 (the M K i and a i are 8-bit values, and | represents concatenation), r is the round number and K r is the 128-bit round subkey for Round q. Each round subkey is the 128-bit output after the execution of three rounds of the cipher algorithm, using the master key (with the addition of different round constants) as both data and key input.
May et al.'s Key Schedule for AES-256
In [13] , the authors conducted statistical tests to show that for their proposal, there is no bit leakage between round subkeys. Furthermore, each round key satisfies both the frequency and Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) tests, indicating good pseudorandomness properties such as bit confusion and diffusion. The authors concluded that previously published attacks that exploit the key schedule such as the standard related-key attacks [1] will not work on their proposed key schedule.
Moreover, the key schedule achieves the property of round key irreversibility, by which we mean that given any subset of the round keys, it is hard to derive the remaining round keys. This forces an adversary to attack all the round keys. This is in contrast to the AES key schedule, which is reversible -given any two round keys, one can derive all the other round keys. The obvious countermeasures for preventing related-key attacks on AES mentioned in the introduction, namely, increasing the number of rounds and hashing the key before expanding it, also produce key schedules which are also reversible.
Equivalent Keys in May et al.'s Key Schedule
Despite the good cryptographic properties of May et al.'s key schedule as mentioned in the previous section, we shall show that their key schedule has equivalent keys as shown in the following proposition. 
.e. they produce the same encryption output.
Proof. Consider the 4-byte tuple (M
We look for those that satisfy the equations:
(1) By a computer simulation, there are 65644 tuples (
) that satisfy equation (1) . In that case,
for the rest of the 16 − s indices, we will have ∆a = 0 = ∆b. From the definition of May et al.'s key schedule, this implies the subkeys derived from M K and M K ′ are the same and they will produce the same encryption output. The number of such equivalent key pairs are given by:
is also an equivalent key pair. Thus we divide the total number of equivalent key pairs by 2 to get 2 271 . ⊓ ⊔ Example 1. As an example, we list the first and last few of the 65644 solutions
(00, 02, aa, be), (00, 02, be, aa), (00, 03, cc, d4), (00, 03, d4, cc), ..., 
Below, we propose an improved version of the May et al.'s key schedule. Basically, we simplify the initialization of a, b so that each byte of a and b only depends on one instead of two bytes of the secret key. This prevents an adversary from using the technique in Proposition 1 to force ∆a and ∆b to be zero. We also make use of key-length-dependent counters keylen to defend against the relatedcipher attack [18] , which was first applied to the alternative AES key schedule proposed by May et al. In the algorithm shown, keylen − 1 refers to the key length of the cipher (minus 1) encoded as a byte. A more detailed explanation of the related-cipher attack can be found in Appendix B.
This key schedule, as with the original key schedule by May et al., has the property of round key irreversibility.
Next, we shall show in the following section that the improved May et al.'s key schedule can protect AES against related-key differential and boomerang attacks. Our aim in this section is to study the security of our improved May et al.'s key schedule against the related-key differential attack which was recently used by Biryukov et al. [4, 3, 5] to attack full-round AES-256. We have the following technical lemma which will be used to prove the main results of this section later on. Lemma 1. For any round subkey generation using the key schedule proposal described above, if we have a pair of master keys with nonzero difference, then the differential characteristic path either has at least four active S-boxes, or it has at least three active S-boxes and an additional four active S-boxes resulting from the generation of a and b.
The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix C of this paper. Based on the above result, we may deduce the following corollary.
Corollary
Proof. By Lemma 1, the differential characteristic path for each subkey generation has at least three active S-boxes, and if there exists a subkey whose differential characteristic path produces only three active S-boxes occurs, then there will be four additional S-boxes involved in generating a and b. This would give at least 13×3+4 = 43 S-boxes in total. On the other hand, if the differential characteristic path for each subkeys produces at least four active S-boxes, there are at least 13 × 4 > 43 S-boxes in total.
⊓ ⊔
In the attacks on AES, we always consider an (N R−2)-round attack involving N R − 1 subkeys, in keeping with [4] where the attack is based on an (N R − 2)-round related-key differential characteristic.
Theorem 1. AES-256 using our improved May et al.'s key schedule is resistant to related-key differential attack.
Proof. We apply Corollary 1 for AES-256 assuming an N R − 2 round attack, i.e. a 12-round attack which involves 13 subkeys. Since each active S-box has probability at most 2 −6 , this gives a probability of at most p k × p c|k = (2 −6 ) 43 × p c|k = 2 −258 × p c|k < 2 −256 . Therefore, we may conclude that AES-256 with the strengthened key schedule is indeed resistant to related-key differential attacks.
May et al. also proposed alternative key schedules for AES-128 and AES-192.
The key schedules proposed by May et al. in [13] for AES-128 and AES-192 are largely the same as that for AES-256, except that a and b are generated in slightly different ways: for r = 0 to N R, j = 0 to 15.
(1) For AES-128:
It is easy to see that equivalent keys similar to those in Proposition 1 exist for May et al.'s key schedule for AES-192. Thus we propose a similar improvement to May et al.'s key schedule for AES-192 below. As before, we also tweaked the key schedules a bit by introducing key-length-dependent counters keylen for protection against the related-cipher attack [18] .
(1) Improvement for AES-128:
(2) Improvement for AES-192:
Based on the above description of the schedules for AES-128 and AES-192, it is easy to deduce the following corollary from the proof of Lemma 1.
Corollary 2. If we have a pair of master keys with nonzero difference in our proposed improvement of the key schedule of [13] for AES-128 and AES-192, then there are at least 3 active S-boxes involved in the generation of each subkey.
Corollary 2 allows us to prove Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. AES-128 and AES-192 using the key schedule of [13] for AES-128 and our improvement for AES-192 are also resistant to related-key differential attack.
Proof. In our improved key schedule for AES-128 and AES-192, we see that if a pair of master keys has non-zero difference, then one of ∆a or ∆b is non-zero. Thus we can use the fact that every differential characteristic path of a round subkey generation has at least 3 active S-boxes (excluding the generation of a and b) from the proof of Lemma 1. For AES-128, an 8-round attack involves 9 subkeys. Assuming that each active S-box has probability 2 −6 , this gives a probability of at least
. Similarly for AES-192, a 10-round attack involves 11 subkeys. The differential characteristic probability is at least p k ×p c|k = (2
Therefore, AES-128 and AES-192 with the strengthened key schedule are resistant to differential related-key attacks.
⊓ ⊔ Remark 1. Our proofs show that the original May et al.'s key schedule is also resistant against related-key differential attack. This is because if a pair of keys is an equivalent weak key pair, then they produce the same roundkeys and we have normal differential attack instead of related-key differential attack. If they are not an equivalent key pair, then ∆a or ∆b is non-zero and we can apply 
Improved May et al.'s Key Schedule is Secure Against Related-Key Boomerang Attack
From Section 2.3, we have seen that given a decomposition of a cipher, including its key schedule, into two smaller sub-ciphers E 0 and E 1 , and given related-key differential characteristics for E 0 and E 1 , if we let the probabilities of their key schedule differential characteristics be p k and q k respectively, the probability of getting a boomerang quartet is less than (p k q k ) 2 .
We consider an arbitrary decomposition of AES, with our improved key schedule, into two smaller sub-ciphers. The generation of the subkeys by the key schedule will be split between the two sub-ciphers. Since the subkeys are independently generated, p k q k is simply the product of the probabilities that the differential characteristics hold for the generation of each subkey.
We note that it may be possible to bypass one subkey for the round at which the cipher is split into two using a boomerang switch. Furthermore, we assume that two rounds at the start can be ignored by not specifying the differences in the differential trail (as in [3] , where one round at the start is ignored). Hence, for AES-128, we consider the generation of 7 subkeys; for AES-192, 9; and for AES-256, 11.
By Lemma 1 and Corollary 2, we see that there are at least 3 active S-boxes involved in the generation of each subkey for all three versions of AES. For t subkeys, the product of the probabilities that the differential characteristics hold for each subkey is (2
. For AES-128, t = 7; for AES-192, t = 9; and for AES-256, t = 11. Hence, for AES with the strengthened key schedule, for any decomposition into two sub-ciphers, there does not exist a boomerang quartet of high probability which can be exploited. Therefore, we have proved that AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 using the strengthened key schedule of [13] are resistant to related-key boomerang attack. We present here a new key schedule for AES that offers several advantages over both the original key schedule (security against related-key differential and boomerang attacks) and that proposed by May et al. [13] (better efficiency). The key schedule shown below generates fifteen 128-bit round keys K i , 0 ≤ i ≤ N R = 14 from a 256-bit master key or thirteen 128-bit round keys K i , 0 ≤ i ≤ N R = 12 from a 192-bit master key. Round key K i is used in the i th round of encryption. For a 256-bit master key, one subkey SK 0 is not converted into a usable round key, and for a 192-bit master key, three subkeys SK 0..2 are not converted into usable round keys.
Here, C j denote 128-bit strings which are initialized by equating them to integers j encoded as 128-bit strings. keylen − 1 refers to the key length of the cipher (minus 1) also encoded as a 128-bit string. 1R AES(x) refers to one round of unkeyed AES with the plaintext x. The AddRoundKey operation in the AES round can be omitted or provided with a null key. for j = 0 to 15
New key schedule proposal for 192-bit and 256-bit keys
These proposed key schedules for AES-192 and AES-256 are partially irreversible, by which we mean that, given two round keys, it is hard to derive the rest of the round keys. However, given certain combinations of three or more round keys, it may be possible to derive the rest of the round keys. For example, if we have SK i , SK i+1 for i = 1 or 2, as well as SK 4 , then we can obtain K1 from SK i , SK i+1 , and then we either have, or can compute SK 3 , and then use SK 4 to get K2. In this sense, this proposed key schedule is weaker than the original and improved key schedules by May et al. Nonetheless, partial irreversibility is a desirable property which is lacking in the original AES-192 and AES-256 key schedules.
The following key schedule shown generates eleven 128-bit round keys K i , 0 ≤ i ≤ N R = 10 from a 128-bit master key. One subkey SK 0 is not converted into a usable round key.
for j = 0 to 11
New key schedule proposal for 128-bit keys
Our proposed key schedule for AES-128 is also partially irreversible in that at least two round keys are needed to derive the rest of the round keys, and only certain combinations of keys can work. In contrast, the original AES-128 key schedule requires only one round key to derive all the other round keys. -The minimum number of active S-boxes in any 4-round differential is 25, independent of the value of the round keys. The maximum differential probability of any differential path through 4 rounds is 2 −150 .
Note that the above results hold only for 4 AES rounds when the input differential is non-zero and encryption is under a fixed key, i.e. the subkey differentials are zero. In all three key schedules, the internal state I i is essentially the AES cipher, except that it is keyed by M K or a part of M K every 4 rounds. The round outputs of the key schedule internal state are then processed to form the round keys K i of the main cipher. For an attacker to control the round key differences ∆K i to launch a related-key attack, he would need to control the output differential ∆I i of the key schedule internal state. Thus our job is to prove that the differential probability of this internal state is low enough to prevent related-key differential and boomerang attacks.
Since we are considering related key differential attack, we assume ∆M K = 0.
Key schedule for AES-128: ∆M K = 0 implies the input differential to the first four AES rounds of the internal state is non-zero. Therefore we can bound the differential characteristic probability of the key schedule internal state I i by 2 −150 . Key schedule for AES-192, AES-256: ∆M K = 0 implies ∆(K1, K2) = 0. Thus, we consider the three cases ∆K1 = 0, ∆K2 = 0; ∆K1 = 0, ∆K2 = 0 and ∆K1 = 0, ∆K2 = 0.
When ∆K1 = 0, ∆K2 = 0, the first round corresponding to internal state I 0 will have a non-zero differential input ∆K1. Rounds 2 to 8 corresponding to I 1 to I 7 will have zero input key differences. Thus the differential characteristic probability of these eight rounds, and consequently, of the entire key schedule internal state I i is at most (2 −150 ) 2 = 2 −300 . When ∆K1 = 0, ∆K2 = 0, the first four rounds corresponding to I 0 to I 3 will have zero differential characteristic probability since there is a zero input difference and no input key differences for all four rounds. The fifth round corresponding to I 4 will have a non-zero differential input ∆K2. Following this, rounds 6 to 12 corresponding to internal state I 5 to I 11 will have zero input key differences. Thus the differential characteristic probability of these eight rounds, and consequently, of the entire key schedule internal state I i is at most (2 −150 ) 2 = 2 −300 . When ∆K1 = 0, ∆K2 = 0, the first round corresponding to internal state I 0 will have a non-zero differential input ∆K1 while rounds 2 to 4 corresponding to I 1 to I 3 will have zero input key differences. This gives a differential characteristic probability of at most 2 −150 for the first four rounds. The differential output after these four rounds is ∆I 3 . If ∆I 3 ⊕ ∆K2 = 0, then we have a non-zero differential input to the next four AES rounds corresponding to I 4 to I 7 . Since rounds 6 to 8 corresponding to internal states I 5 to I 8 have zero key differences, this gives a differential characteristic probability of at most 2 −150 for rounds 5 to 8. If ∆I 3 ⊕∆K2 = 0, then there is no differential characteristic probability associated with rounds 5 to 8. But ∆K1 will be a non-zero differential input to the next four AES rounds while rounds 10 to 12 corresponding to internal states I 8 to I 11 have zero input key differences. This gives a differential characteristic probability of at most 2 −150 for rounds 9 to 12. In both cases, the differential characteristic probability of the key schedule internal state I i is at most (2 −150 ) 2 = 2 −300 . For protection against related-key boomerang attack, it is not hard to see from the above proof that when we split the cipher into two sub-ciphers E 0 , E 1 , the corresponding internal state I i of the key schedule for one of the sub-cipher will contain 4 unkeyed AES rounds with a non-zero input differential. This means one of p k or q k is bounded by 2 −150 and that (p k q k ) 2 ≤ 2 −300 . Thus our cipher is secure against related-key boomerang attack.
⊓ ⊔ For protection against other attacks on the key schedule, the use of round counters defeats slide attacks [6, 7] . As in the case for the improved May et al.'s key schedule, the use of key-length-dependant counters keylen defeats the relatedcipher attack [18] .
The key schedule offers better efficiency than the proposal by May et al. which invokes three AES rounds and a few S-box lookups per round key. Our key schedule proposal invokes at most an (amortized) 1.25 AES rounds per round key, making it more suitable for hardware implementation. If two AES round functions are implemented in parallel, it is three times as fast as the May et al. key schedule to encrypt; or if a single AES round function is implemented, it is twice as fast.
Hardware Implementation
Usually hardware implementations of encryption algorithms are optimized for high throughput, i.e. first for speed and then for area. If we look on these typically round-based architectures, our proposed new AES key schedule introduces only minor timing overheads compared to the original AES key schedule. Then for the encryption of one block with a 128-bit key 11 clock cycles are required (compared to 10 clock cycles for standard AES) and for 192-bit and 256-bit keys we need 15 clock cycles compared to 12 and 14 clock cycles, respectively. Note that for AES-256 -which suffers most from recent related key attacks and needs to be fixed most urgently-this is an overhead of only 7%.
At the same time, the similarity of the key schedule and the data path allows a better time-area trade-off and thus more flexibility for implementation. A designer can choose to implement both data paths (as described above, variant A) or to share resources between them (variant B). The latter variant B allows to save area at the cost of additional clock cycles (21 for AES-128, 25 for and 29 for AES-256). The proposal by May et al. invokes three AES rounds and a few S-box lookups per round key. Therefore it cannot compute the round keys on-the-fly and will never achieve the same speed as the standard AES or our proposal, regardless of the hardware spent. Using a shared data path (variant B), our proposal is twice as fast as the proposal by May et al., and using two separate data paths (variant A) it is three times faster.
Also the area overhead of our proposal is very moderate as the following estimations, which are based on the 180 nm UMCL18G212D3 standard-cell library from UMC [16] , indicate. In a round-based implementation, we need two 128-bit XOR gates to add M K and SK (600 GE) and a 4-bit XOR gate to add C i (10 GE). Depending on the key length we need a 7-bit XOR gate (17 GE) or an 8-bit XOR gate (19 GE) and for AES-192 and AES-256 we also need a 128-bit MUX (342 GE). Finally a 128-bit AND gate (170 GE) is required to handle the proper addition of M K and the variables I and SK need to be stored in flip-flops (1536 GE). If the master key is never changed, it can be hardwired and requires no gates. Otherwise we have an additional storage overhead of 768 GE for AES-128, 1152 GE for AES-192, and 1536 GE for AES-256. For variant A an additional complete round of AES is required. Since the gate count for an AES round depends on a wide variety of design choices, an estimation of the total overhead for variant A is difficult. We therefore concentrate on variant B, which only needs an additional 128-bit AND gate (170 GE). For variant B our proposal introduces an overhead of 2505 GE with a hardwired M K and 3270 GE with a flexible M K for AES-128. For AES-192 it sums up to 2850-4000 GE and for AES-256 to 2850-4385 GE.
To put these overhead figures into perspective, please note that a typical throughput-optimized co-processor implementation of AES-128 requires tens of thousands of GE: Satoh et al. report such an implementation on a 0.11 µm technology with 54,000 GE [15] , while the implementation of Pramstaller et al. on a 0.6 µm technology requires 85,000 GE [14] .
Conclusion
We summarized the related-key differential and boomerang attacks on AES-256 and developed a framework for the protection of block ciphers against both attacks. It can be easily observed that the main cipher of AES is still secure against conventional non related-key attacks. So a natural approach to strengthen AES against these latest attacks is to strengthen the key schedule of AES.
We analyzed May et al.'s key schedule and found equivalent keys associated with it. Therefore, using our developed framework, we suggested an improvement to their key schedule. In addition, we also proposed a key schedule of our own. The main advantages of these two schedules over the original AES key schedule are that both achieve related-key differential and boomerang attack resistance, and both provide partial or full round key irreversibility.
Comparing the two new key schedules, the significant advantage of the improved May et al.'s key schedule over our second proposed key schedule is that it has full round key irreversibility. However, it suffers from the disadvantage that it uses three AES rounds to derive a subkey and thus, cannot be on-the fly. Therefore, the improved May et al.'s key schedule is suitable for use in software applications where the key schedule is only run once, or in hardware applications where high speed is not very crucial.
On the other hand, the advantage of our second proposed key schedule over the improved May et al.'s key schedule is that it is much more efficient and can be implemented on-the-fly, rendering it suitable for hardware applications. However, the trade-off is that the latter has only partial round key irreversibility. A summary of our analysis is shown in Table 1 below. B Related-Cipher Attack of [18] The related-cipher attack [18] is applicable to related block ciphers with the same round function but different round numbers, and whose key schedules do not depend on the total round number. More concretely, consider two related block ciphers with round numbers r and r + ∆r respectively. If the same key is used in these two ciphers to encrypt the same message, then a related-cipher attack can be carried out on a ∆r-round cipher. For this ∆r-round cipher, the plaintext is the ciphertext of the r-round cipher and the ciphertext is that of the r + ∆r-round cipher. The key can be easily found if ∆r is small. To defend against the related-cipher attack, the key schedule should be related to the total round number so that when the same key is used to encrypt the same plaintext, the intermediate value after the i th round in the r-round cipher will be different from that in the r ′ -round cipher (r = r ′ ). Now let us consider a related-cipher attack on AES-192 and AES-256, both based on May et al.'s original key schedules as described in Section 3. Suppose the 192-and 256-bit keys are formed by a concatenation of a 64-bit key. Then one can easily check that the first 12 round keys for AES-192 and AES-256 produced by May et al.'s original key schedule would be identical and for the same plaintext, the ciphers would produce the same output after 12 rounds. Thus we can use the ciphertext of AES-192 as the input to round 13 in AES-256. Together with the ciphertext of AES-256, we can implement a 2-round attack.
In contrast, we included the XOR of keylen − 1 in the computation of a j and b j for our improved May et al.'s key schedule. Therefore, the first twelve subkeys for AES-192 and AES-256 would be different since the two corresponding key schedules are initialized with different constants, 191 and 255 respectively. Thus the related-cipher attack of [18] will not work in this instance. Similarly, our second proposed key schedule as described in Section 4 also resists the relatedcipher attack since C 0 is always taken to be the XOR of the Master Key and keylen − 1. is the data input difference to the subkey generation function and ∆b is the key input difference to each round of the subkey generation function, where (∆a (0) 0 ) j = ∆a j = ∆S(M K j ) and (∆b) j = ∆S(M K j+16 ). The output difference ∆a (3) 0 is the difference in the round subkey. We make a few observations about these differences.
(1) After applying the SubBytes operation to the state, the positions of the active bytes are unchanged. The ShiftRows operation preserves the number of active bytes, so the input difference to the SubBytes operation ∆a 
C.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We restate the lemma.
For any round subkey generation using the key schedule proposal described above, if we have a pair of master keys with nonzero difference, then the differential characteristic path either has at least four active S-boxes, or it has at least three active S-boxes and an additional four active S-boxes resulting from the generation of a and b.
Proof. We denote n and m to be the number of nonzero bytes in ∆a and ∆b respectively, and we write k and l for the number of nonzero bytes in ∆a respectively. Then the number of active S-boxes in the differential characteristic path is n + k + l. We also note that if ∆M K = 0, then ∆(a, b) = (0, 0). We consider the various cases below.
(1) n = 0
We have ∆a = 0, so ∆b = 0 and m = 0. Since ∆a has more than one active column, then, ∆a , and we can write ∆a has either one or two columns active. If it has two columns active, then all eight bytes in the two columns are active, and we also know that ∆a (1) 0 has two active bytes. If ∆a (1) 2 has one column active, then at least three of the bytes in that column active, and the two bytes of ∆a 0 ⊕ ∆b has at least two active columns, so we must have n ≥ 2. Then n+k+l ≥ 2+2+0 = 4. If k ≥ 3, then because n ≥ 1, we have n + k + l ≥ 4.
We either have n = k = l = 1, or n + k + l ≥ 4. Assume n = k = l = 1. Then n + k + l = 3, and since ∆a
2 has four active bytes and ∆a (1) 0 has one active byte, ∆b = ∆a (0) 2 ⊕ ∆a (1) 0 has at least three active bytes, i.e. m ≥ 3. Since n + m ≥ 4, we have at least four active S-boxes from the generation of a and b.
